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Rail car dilemma 
A. Clyde Vollmers 
Associate professor of economics, 
Moorhead State University, 
Former assistant professor of economics, 
South Dakota State University 
It's a persistent agony for 
farmers, elevators, and railroads: toe 
few rail cars to move grain to market. 
The agony is more than the frus­
tration of not being able to freely 
respond to market moves. It is out-of­
pocket costs for storage, and it is a 
loss of income that might have been 
received, could the grain have moved. 
For example, one study estimated 
the total cost from the lack of trans­
portation equipment in 1969 to Iowf 
elevators alone was $2.36 million. 
Private industry has not found an 
answer to rail car shortages. State 
governments are beginning to suggest 
solutions. 
During the 1980 legislative 
session, the South Dakota governor 
suggested the purchase of rail cars by 
the state to supplement railroad and 
elevator fleets. 
South Dakota is not alone in 
examining the purchase of.rail cars. 
The Highway and Transportation Depart­
ment in Michigan has made a similar 
proposal. North Dakota recently con­
cluded a feasibility study on the same 
alternative. In October 1979, Sas­
katchewan ordered 1000 covered hopper 
rail cars. 
This is a new approach to relieve 
equipment shortages. But when past 
attempts to resolve a problem have 
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failed, public officials may be forced 
to venture into uncharted waters. This 
report is an attempt to assist decision 
makers in evaluating the probable 
success of such a move. 
History and causes of the 
rail car shortages 
Seasonal shortages of rail cars is 
an old problem. The very first case 
heard before the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) in 1887 "involved a 
complaint by the North Dakota Board of 
Railroad Commissioners against the 
Northern Pacific Railway for failing to 
provide adequate Zar service to North 
Dakota shippers." 
Again, "as early as 190 7 the ICC 
held extensive hearings on freight car 
shortages, receiving testimony from 
shippers of grain, coal, and lumber on 
their inability to obtain freight cars 
in sufficie�t numbers at the time 
requested." 
In the fall of 1921, the Joint 
Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, 
created by a Senate resolution, found 
that "the supply of box cars, coal 
cars, stock cars, and refrigerator cars 
is inadequate to meet the demand during 
normal periods of actjyity aDd should 
be rapidly augmented.'8 
In 1953, William Hudson found that 
"a tight boxcar situation with periodic 
shortages, particularly of the better 
class of equipment required for grain 
and grain products, will probably cgn­
tinue over the next several years." 
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Elevators have started acquiring 
private fleets to reach markets but 
this has not been an answer, either. 
No single factor is the primary 
cause of the continuing shortage of 
rail cars. Instead, the shortage has 
come from the interaction of numerous 
economic and non-economic factors over 
time: 
1. The railroads have failed to 
share in the general economic pros­
perity. 
They have earned an average of 2�% 
return on investment between 1964 and 
1979; during the last 5 years the 
return averaged 1.6%.6 Railroad 
earnings are not sufficient to meet all 
their capital requirements, and the low 
rate of return discourages reinvesting 
railroad earnings back into the rail­
road and also fails to attract outside 
capital. 
2. The seasonal production 
,pattern of grain, combined with year­
to-year variation in foreign demand, 
creates shortages and surpluses of rail 
equipment over time. 
The result is that "carriers may 
invest in capacity that is under­
utilized during off-peak periods or use 
existing capacity so intensively that 
costs increase in greater proportion 
than output."7 
These changes in demand over 
time can be compounded by agricultural 
production practices. For example, the 
technological development and adapta­
tion of the picker sheller and corn 
dryer increased (from 29 to 59%) the 
amount of corn moving dir3ctly to Iowa 
elevators during harvest. 
Increases in farm storage capacity 
also provided farmers with the ability 
to alter historical marketing patterns. 
This creates surges in grain movements 
in response to changes in grain demand 
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rather than the predictable pattern of 
grain production. 
3. Fewer general purpose cars 
which can be c�nverted to haul grain 
are available. 
Railroads and shippers are con­
stantly striving to reduce labor re­
quirements while providing greater 
protection for cargo. The result has 
been the demise of the plain, 40-foot, 
narrow door boxcar. It has been re­
placed by cars specifically designed 
and equipped to meet the requirements 
of individual commodities. 
This results, however; in an in­
flexible car fleet which cannot serve 
multiple uses as transportation demands 
change. Therefore the percentage of 
loaded miles has decreased from 67% of 
total miles in 1946 to 57.9% in 1979. 
4. Rail rates remain stable 
throughout the year, failing to reflect 
the seasonality of grain production or 
to allocate demand over time. 
While the Railroad Revitalization 
and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (RRRR 
Act) addressed this issue by instruct­
ing the ICC "to provide sufficient 
incentive to shippers to reduce peak­
period shipments,"lO seasonal rates 
were not widely adopted and the pro­
vision was repealed in 1980. 
5. Low per diem rates do not 
encourage car ownership. 
Per diem rates are the fees paid 
by one railroad to another for using 
rail cars and are established by the 
American Association of Railroad (AAR) 
and the ICC. Historically they have 
been maintained at a level which is 
below cost to the railroad owning the 
car. 
The low level of per diem fees 
continues primarily through the efforts 
of those railroads whose total car 
usage is greater than their ownership. 
These carriers are located within 
territories which terminate more inter­
regional carloads than are originated. 
Historically, these have been the 
eastern roads. 
The western roads, including those 
serving South Dakota, are forced to 
interline carloads of traffic with 
eastern carriers. Rather than invest 
in cars to meet their needs, the defi­
cit carriers simply keep the cars and 
use them as long as they are needed. 
During periods of car surpluses, 
cars are returned to the owning carrier 
empty, while westbound loads are loaded 
in the cars owned by the deficit 
carriers. In addition to an increase 
in empty miles, which use additional 
resources, this practice also places a 
disproportionate share of the cost of 
the car surplus upon railroads having 
an adequate car supply. 
The Association of American Rail­
roads instituted a multilevel per diem 
rate on January 1, 1964. Grunfield 
surnmarized, the impact of the per diem . . J..l -:..ncentive, 
( a) a per diem rate which was 
less than prospective daily owner­
ship costs of a new freight car 
would lead to an overall defi­
ciency in freight car ownership; 
(b ) a single per diem rate would 
discourage the purchase of the 
more expensive freight cars with 
their greater annual depreciation 
expense; and (c) a seasonally 
inflexible per diem rate would 
fail to equate freight car demand 
with opportunity costs during peak 
and off-peak periods. 
6. Existing demurrage charges 
make rail cars economical storage 
alternatives during periods of storage 
stress. 
Demurrage is the fee that shippers 
and receivers pay for holding a rail 
car beyond the normal time necessary 
for loading or unloading. While the 
daily demurrage rate increases with 
time, elevators which are filled be­
cause of heavy grain movement still 
find rail cars an economical storage 
alternative. Unfortunately, this 
inefficient use of grain cars normally 
occurs during harvest periods when car 
shortages often are greatest. 
7. The ICC is charged with the 
responsibility of protecting the public 
interest and must decide between the 
interests of large and small shippers. 
Large elevators, capable of ship­
ping unit trains, use rail cars much 
more efficiently than smaller eleva­
tors. According to an Iowa study, the 
movement of grain in unit trains re­
quires only 28% of the number of cars 
that would be needed to transport the 
grain in single car movements.12 Thus 
the ICC is charged with choosing be­
tween efficiency and equity. 
A recent policy limited the per­
centage of cars used in unit trains, 
consequently protecting the interests 
of the smaller and branchline elevators 
while reducing the total amount of 
grain which is moved. 
In August 1980 the responsibility 
for car service was shifted to the AAR. 
Renewed emphasis on efficiency will 
likely lead to policies improving car 
utilization to the detriment of smaller 
shippers. 
8. An eighth factor is the 
limited capacity of American rail car 
builders. 
Over the past decade, purchasers 
have faced order backlogs which have 
delayed delivery of grain cars for many 
months. This backlog limits the abil­
ity of railroads or elevators to 
respond quickly to changes in demand 
and it also means public purchases 
will delay private purchases. 
9. The most important factor 
contributing to rail car shortages is 
that ownership of cars is simply not 
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profitable for either railroads or 
elevators. This is discussed in the 
following section. 
The economics of 
public car ownership 
Owning or leasing rail cars is 
unprofitable for both elevators and 
railroads. If it were profitable, 
railroads would be buying cars, rather 
than reducing investment as they have 
in the past. During the last 10 years, 
for example, class one railroads re­
duced their car ownerihip by over 
20, 000 cars per year. 3 
The argument can also be extended 
to shippers who would gladly purchase 
cars if they were a good investment. 
Shippers have also been reluctant 
investors. While shipper-owned or 
leased cars increased by over 6, 400 13 
units per year between 1969 and 1979, 
they were not purchased as an invest­
ment but rather as a necessary cost of 
doing business. 
Rail markets often pay more for 
grain than truck markets, and elevators 
need rail cars to receive the higher 
bid. Since railroads do not provide 
enough rail cars the elevators have had 
to acquire their own. They lose money 
on their private fleets, but the higher 
price received for the grain off sets 
the loss and their total income is 
increased. 
The major variables that influence 
profit in owning rail cars are turn­
around time, car cost, and mileage 
credits (Table 1) . 
Turnaround is the number of trips 
a car makes each month and is usually 
higher if the car is in a unit train. 
Car co.sts can be estimated either 
through a lease or purchase price. 
Both methods are used extensively by 
shippers. Mileage credits are the fees 
paid by railroads to shippers when 
shippers use their own car. The early 
1980 rate was 24 cents per loaded mile 
,for covered hopper cars. 
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Table 1 reveals that car lease 
payments exceed mileage earnings for 
all reasonable assumptions. Histori­
cally, rail car investments have not 
been profitable for carriers or ship­
pers. (Figures in Table 1 represent 
actual turnaround experienced by pri­
vate shippers. ) 
State owned or leased cars would 
incur the same kind of deficit requir­
ing continuing operating support in 
addition to the initial cost. For 
these reasons, railroads and elevators 
have not purchased grain cars. 
Turnaround and public 
ownership of rail cars 
A major factor contributing to 
grain car availability is the effi­
ciency with which rail cars are used 
(turnaround) . 
Efficiency and equity 
Throughout their history, rail­
roads have been charged with discrimi­
nation against some shippers in the 
allocation of cars. Through the pur­
chase of rail equipment the state could 
attempt to alleviate this. 
As the railroads already have, the 
state will find, however, that effi­
ciency and equity are often mutually 
exclusive goals. 
The elevators which are experienc­
ing the greatest shortage are also the 
most expensive to serve, i. e., the 
small or branchline elevators. If it 
serves these elevators, the state will 
reduce turnaround and increase the net 
cost per bushel. 
The state would have to choose 
between efficiency and equity, between 
moving the greater volume of grain for 
each dollar invested and serving all 
the elevators in South Dakota. This 
would be an extremely difficult deci­
sion for any public employee. 
Assignment problems 
The state could assign cars per­
manently to individual shippers, but 
this would result in a fleet which 
would be inflexible and unresponsive to 
changes in demand. 
Further, a permanent assignment 
based on shipper needs is difficult to 
justify. If a shipper would benefit 
enough to merit a permanently assigned 
state car, he should invest in a pri­
vate fleet. 
The state could also assign the 
cars to the railroad's fleet, but this 
would mean the carriers would allocate 
the cars. And if the cars ever re­
turned to South Dakota, the same allo­
cation problems created by the rail­
roads in the past would continue. 
Empty cars could also be assigned 
after each trip but this requires extra 
handling by the railroads and takes 
extra time, which increases costs. 
Management 
The elevators which have used 
their fleets the most efficiently have 
hired full-time traffic managers. A 
fleet of 1,000 cars would take a mini­
mum staff of three state employees and 
a high-speed computer compatible with 
the railroad computers. 
Periods of surplus equipment 
The seasonality of grain 
marketing creates fluctuations in 
demand for transportation services. 
Some firms have gotten around this and 
achieved a higher level of utilization 
by co-leasing with shippers with dif­
ferent seasonal demand patterns. For 
example, grain dealers and fertilizer 
dealers occasionally co-lease equip­
ment, and each shipper uses the cars 
during his period of greatest need. 
Occasionally, a shipper will find 
that seasonal patterns have fluctuated, 
and he needs the cars when they are 
assigned to the co-lessee. A private 
business recognizes this may happen, 
that to maximize long-term profits, an 
occasional short-term loss may be 
incurred. 
Considering the political problems 
that could result if state owned rail 
cars were moving fertilizer during a 
grain car shortage, it is unlikely any 
public official could advocate a co­
lease. 
Under existing tariff regula­
tions 14 railroads need not accept 
private (state owned) cars during 
periods of car surpluses. And the 
significant variation in the volume of 
grain marketed within and between crop 
years can quickly turn car shortages 
into surpluses. 
For example, weekly shortages of 
8, 000 covered hoppers during October 
1976 evaporated into surpluses of 
nearly 5, 000 cars per week by the end 
of the year. Surpluses also existed 
during most of May through September 
1977 (Table 2) . 
During the time of surplus equip­
ment, the state would encounter the 
same dilemma as the other non-rail 
owners: how to capitalize on an in­
vestment which is continuing to incur 
costs but which cannot be used. 
In addition, cars not in use incur 
a storage charge if they are held on a 
railroad-owned siding, and many eleva­
tors in South Dakota do not own their 
sidings. 
The problem of surplus equipment 
could be resolved in the short run by 
requiring that publicly owned rail cars 
be utilized before carrier or shipper­
supplied equipment. This would mini­
mize the net public cost, but as the 
railroads and elevators became the 
residual car supplier, utilization of 
their equipment would decrease, making 
ownership more expensive and encourag­
ing an even faster disinvestment for 
railroads and the reduction of shipper 
investment. This would be counter­
productive to the long run objective 
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that state provision of rail cars was 
designed to achieve. 
Impact of public provision 
upon car supply 
In spite of potential management 
difficulties or operating costs, the 
critical issue in determining if the 
state should purchase rail cars is the 
long-run impact. Will public provision 
permanently increase the total supply 
of rail cars available for South Dakota 
grain shippers, or could the supply 
actually be decreased over time? 
The answer is dependent upon the 
expected behavior or response of existing 
car owners, including railroads and 
elevators. 
If one assumes that public invest­
ment will have no impact upon either 
private investment or car allocation, 
the additional investor would increase 
the total car supply and relieve a 
portion of the cost imposed by short­
ages. 
Unfortunately, this is an unlikely 
outcome for several reasons. 
First, limited capacity exists for 
building rail cars, and delivery us­
ually varies from between 1 and 2 
years. Consequently, the total number 
of cars which can be manufactured will 
not increase with state purchase, and 
an investment would simply delay de­
livery to private purchasers. Second, 
the assumption does not consider the 
economic incentives for either the 
railroad or elevators which own or 
lease cars. 
If, on the other hand, one assumes 
that the railroads and shippers will 
react, naturally in the manner that 
will best benefit them, the effective 
increase in rail cars will be far less 
than the state's purchase. In fact, it 
is possible that the long-term impact 
will be to reduce the number of cars 
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available to move grain. We cannot 
expect that current car owners will not 
react. 
Railroads have existed in a highly 
regulated environment for many years 
and have learned to make calculated 
decisions based upon the response they 
expect from the public sector. In 
fact, railroads are often accused of 
strategic manipulation in other deci­
sion making processes such as branch­
line abandonment cases. It would 
indeed be unfortunate for those who I 
consider themselves victims of present 
railroad manipulative behavior to 
design new institutions which would 
encourage further behavior of a simi­
lar nature! 
These allegations, however, are 
simply charges that the railroads are 
attempting to maximize profits within 
the parameters in which they work. 
There is little reason to expect them 
to alter their profit-maximizing be­
havior when planning car investment. 
The continuing low rate of return 
to car ownership provides no incentive 
for the railroads to purchase addi­
tional cars or even to maintain the 
existing fleet. It is more profitable 
to disinvest in rail cars and use the 
capital for other purposes, very likely 
non-rail investment. 
A change in the rules of the game 
will encourage railroads to carry this 
further. If they believe that states 
will purchase rail cars, they will 
encourage even greater public invest­
ment. This could be accomplished by 
(1) continuation of their disinvestment 
policy and (2) reassigning cars to 
states not purchasing rail cars. 
The other major source of grain 
cars is the elevators, which have 
become unwilling investors in response 
to the railroad's disinvestment. 
Rail cars are profitable for grain 
elevators because greater net returns 
can be secured in rail-based markets. 
But because of rail disinvestment, 
carrier supplied cars are not readily 
available, and many elevators have 
responded by purchasing or leasing 
cars. However, mileage credits do not 
offset lease costs; consequently, the 
rail cars themselves result in a net 
cost. 
Thus while access to their own 
rail cars is profitable for elevators 
access to someone else's car is even 
more profitable. The elevators will 
also approve rail equipment purchase by 
the state. 
The ultimate strategy which would 
be adopted by elevators is, however 
more difficult to project. 
They have more to lose if rail cars 
are unavailable, but they also have 
better access to public opinion and to 
state officials. Consequently, they are 
in a better position to affect public 
behavior. As long as shippers believe 
that a public investment might be forth­
coming, they will put off private in­
vestment. Shippers will also actively 
encourage public investment through 
lobbying and news releases. 
Once the rumor starts of a possible 
public purchase, the state must move 
promptly and make a forceful decision. 
As long as the decision remains un­
resolved or private investors perceive 
an irresolute decision, they will delay 
additional rail car purchases. 
Because public investment dis­
courages private investment, once the 
state has initiated a fleet, the pres­
sure will be to expand the public fleet 
as private owners disinvest. 
Of course, it can be argued that 
the state can purchase perhaps 1, 000 
cars and announce that it is a one-time 
transaction, never to be repeated. This 
is simply Round 2 of game theory. In 
Round 3, most shippers probably would 
believe further public pressure could 
force another round of state investment, 
and then another. 
The exact outcome is difficult to 
call without estimating supply and 
demand functions. However, there is no 
doubt that in the short run, the in­
crease in the total supply of grain cars 
will be significantly less than the 
number of cars the state purchased. 
A decrease in the supply of rail cars 
It is possible, under some con­
ditions, that by purchasing rail cars 
the state would actually decrease the 
supply which is available to move grain. 
Should private investors believe 
that additional public purchases are 
possible, the long-term impact could 
actually be a reduction in cars avail­
able as private interests attempt to 
"force" additional public investment. 
Second, the ultimate measurement is 
car capacity, which is a function of the 
number of cars and the turnaround. 
Turnaround for state owned cars may well 
be less than for privately owned cars. 
A decrease in turnaround amounts to 
reduced capacity available to move 
grain. Third, railroads could shift 
cars to other states. 
Should each of these probable 
outcomes occur, the long-term impact 
would be a net decrease in the number of 
cars available to move grain. 
The fact that the net increase in 
cars is less than the total state 
purchase o+ cars yields interesting 
economic results. 
Normal accounting practices would 
divide the total cost of owning the rail 
fleet by the bushels of grain moved, 
thus determining the state's cost per 
bushel and measuring the effectiveness 
of the state investment. This would 
underestimate the actual additional cost 
per bushel. 
The net cost per bushel of the 
state car purchase should be determined 
by dividing the total cost of the state 
fleet by the number of bushels moved in 
excess of the grain which would have 
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moved without the state purchase. If 
the net additional car capacity is 
significan�ly less than the state's 
total acquisition, the cost of moving 
the additional grain becomes rather 
large. 
Summary: impact of public provision 
upon car supply 
Analysis suggests that state 
acquisition of rail cars would have 
little positive impact upon the total 
supply in the long run. It is also very 
likely that the result would be a de­
crease in the total supply. Conse­
quently, any additional bushels of grain 
moved would be extremely costly. 
This plan addresses only the 
symptoms and does not treat the causes. 
The state does have some viable alterna­
tives to public ownership available 
which would address the causes, increase 
car supply, and stabilize demand. 
Viable alternatives to 
increase rail car availability 
Supply side modifications 
Rental rates--in the form of per 
diem, demurrage, and shipping rates--are 
at a level below ownership costs. An 
unregulated pricing structure would 
increase the return to car ownership and 
would thereby encourage additional 
investment. 
A proven way to increase the supply 
of rail cars is collective action be­
tween various elevators. 
In some instances the purchase of 
rail cars has been included in an over­
all cooperative effort such as building 
a subterminal. In other cases the only 
collective action effort has been to 
acquire and manage a cooperative fleet 
of rail cars. 
In spite of its success, collective 
action has not become widely adopted in 
South Dakota because of insufficient 
information and organizational costs. 
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One answer would be a rail car expert 
within the State Department of Transpor­
tation. This individual would have the 
needed information regarding all aspects 
of car leases, including cost and risk, 
and could facilitate organizational 
efforts. 
This institutional arrangement 
would, of course, reinforce the rail­
roads' current disinvestment strategy. 
Demand side modifications 
When grain prices are high or 
during harvest season, cars can't be 
found. At other times, rail cars 
stand idle. If, by some method, de­
mand 0an be spread out through the 
year, existing cars will be used more 
efficiently and new ones may not need 
to be purchased. 
Felton �as suggested a rail car 
market in which potential users could 
bid for railroad equipment.1
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In 
addition to encouraging additional 
investment on the supply side, this 
would allocate equipment more eff ec­
tively and partially eliminate the 
problems of seasonal demand variation, 
non-compensatory per diem and demurrage 
rates, allocation among shippers, and 
the decrease in utilization. 
Other methods which would ef fec­
tively change time of demand include 
flexible rail rates and seasonal rates. 
Should variable rates be implemented, 
elevators could not lock in a transpor­
tation rate as they contract grain for 
future delivery. Therefore, elevator 
margin would widen unless a futures 
market in transportation service were 
developed to protect elevators against 
transportation risk. Wider margins 
would be borne by the farmer. 
However, the volume of grain 
requiring transportation is too volatile 
to suggest that these marginal changes 
would be completely effective in 
allocating demand over time. 
While domestic demand for grain is 
relatively stable over time, export 
demand fluctuates greatly in response 
to various factors such as weather­
generated shortfalls of grain in other 
countries, embargoes and other foreign 
policy, and policies of other nations. 
Each time export (and thus domestic) 
prices decline, farmers react by 
reducing the volume they are willing to 
sell and increasing the amount they 
store. As part of its food policy, the 
public sector responds by making on­
farm storage easier. Both construction 
and carrying charges are subsidized. 
But when prices improve, an even larger 
volume of grain will require transpor­
tation, compounding car shortages and 
creating even larger transportation 
bottlenecks. 
Again, a public policy designed to 
assist a segment of the citizenry 
generates reactions which may be totally 
contrary to perceived public good. 
It should be noted that on-farm 
storage which allocates grain over the 
marketing year contributes to the 
orderly utilization of rail cars. On­
farm storage which enables farmers to 
store production from more than one 
crop year compounds the cyclical nature 
of grain marketing and compounds car 
allocation problems. 
Direct farmer ownership of storage 
facilities at ports would reduce build­
up of grain at the point of production 
and even out the seasonal demand for 
cars. 
Farmers, acting collectively, 
would build storage facilities near a 
port with some type of transfer to the 
export houses. Their grain would be 
shipped via the normal mode, mixed with 
grain of others, to this storage 
facility during periods of low prices. 
When an individual was ready to sell, 
he would issue instructions to the 
facility manager to deliver the grain 
,to an export house. 
Obviously this suggestion is 
plagued with numerous prohlems: (1) 
potential managerial difficulties, (2) 
liability claims for transit or storage 
damage, (3) unwillingness of local 
elevators to load farmer-owned 
grain, (4) lack of physical control by 
farmers, and (5) the higher construc­
tion, land, and tax costs at an urban 
facility. Finally, farmers generally 
do not count up all the costs of on­
farm storage. Off-farm storage will 
appear expensive by comparison. 
Nevertheless, the potential bene­
fits of a storage facility justify 
further exploration. The public sector 
could facilitate collective action and 
provide information. Existing agricul­
tural and food programs and tax laws 
would also need to be modified before 
off-farm storage could materialize. 
The exact impact that direct 
farmer ownership of storage facilities 
at ports would have upon agricultural 
production and marketing is unclear. 
However, existing agricultural policy 
and tax laws which encourage investment 
in farm storage facilities beyond one 
year's crop are probably going to 
compound the rail car shortage over 
time. 
Conclusions 
The state is correct that public 
intervention is necessary before supply 
and demand for rail cars will match 
more evenly than they do now. 
State purchase of rail cars will 
not ease the problem of seasonal and 
costly car shortages. It may make the 
situation even worse. Another entity, 
whether it be private or government, 
which will take over the expense of 
owning rail cars is exactly what rail­
roads and shippers want. They could 
then reduce their own investments in 
the cars and reinvest their money in 
(for them) more economical assets. 
Consequently, the increase in rail 
car supply will be significantly less 
than the total number of cars acquired 
1 1  
by the state. The final impact could 
actually be a decrease in the total 
supply of cars. 
couraging collective and cooperative 
action among the various elevators. 
A more positive and permanent 
solution would be state activity en-
The problem of seasonal grain car 
shortages will not go away until we 
change or correct the causes of the 
problem. Only then will an adequate 
fleet of cars be available to transport 
grain produced in South Dakota. 
Table 1. Cost of monthly rail car ownership 
Assume: 
Cost of 
lease per 
month 
$570 
570 
570 
570 
576 
604 
580 
640 
640 
(1) A 15-year lease signed during the first quarter of 
1980. A likely lease rate would include a monthly 
payment of $570 and an annual charge of $0.02 for each 
mile over 30, 000. This rate is subject to increases 
as maintenance costs increase. 
(2) Railroads pay $0.24 per loaded mile for privately 
leased or owned covered hoppers during early 1980. 
(3) These figures represent 100% utilization, 12 months 
per year. Costs increase rapidly if the cars are idle. 
Number of loads 
per month 
] 1 2 
3 
1
1 
22 
3 
1 
1.66
3 
2 4 
Monthly 
mileage credit 
earned 
300-mile one-way trip 
$ 72 
144 
216 
700-mile one-way trip 
168 
336 
504 
15 00-mile one-way trip 
360 
600
5 
525 
Profit or (loss) 
per car 
per month 
$(498) 
(426) 
(354) 
(402) 
(240) 
(100) 
(220) 
( 40) 
(l15) 
l 
Probable turnaround for single car movement, current turnaround for 
2
Burlington Northern (BN) 
3
Probable turnaround for unit train 
4
Turnaround achieved by unit train shippers in Nebraska using BN 
5
Turnaround achieved by unit train shippers in Nebraska using Union Pacific 
The Union Pacific has a lower rate rather than a mileage credit which works 
out to about $0.175 per loaded mile 
12 
Table 2. Surplus and (shortage) of the U. S. rail car supply for a 70-week period
1 
40-foot 40-foot 
narrow narrow 
door Covered door Covered 
Week box cars hopper Week box cars hopper 
9/ 4/76 9, 311 (3,621) 5/ 7 /77 3,946 (996) 
9/11/76 9,220 (2,623) 5/14/77 5,284 627 
9/25/76 9,185 (3,980 5/21/77 5,940 1,955 
10/ 2/76 8,242 (4,017) 6/ 4/77 7 ,811 2,577 
10/ 9/76 7,346 (3,919) 6/11/77 8,238 2,020 
10/16/76 3,673 (8,130) 6/18/77 8,595 386 
10/23/76 3,072 (9,142) 6/25/77 8,302 705 
10/30/76 3,209 (8,056) 7 I 2/77 7,912 1,486 
11/ 6/76 2,740 (7,261) 7/ 9/77 6,318 (32) 
11/13/76 6,329 (5,671) 7/16/77 5,140 (62) 
11/20/76 7,509 (3,848) 7/23/77 3,773 (1,415) 
11/27/76 9,500 (1,104) 7/30/77 3,024 (1,035) 
12/ 4/76 10,923 1,463 8/ 6/77 2,656 (1,050) 
12/11/76 11, 129 2,800 8/13/77 2,251 (543) 
12/18/76 11,805 4,884 8/20/77 3,121 41 
12/25/76 12,996 5,216 8/27/77 3,129 1,098 
1/ 1/77 12,734 5,279 9/ 3/77 3,706 1,935 
1/ 8/77 11,695 2,641 9/10/77 3,542 949 
1/15/77 10,700 (835) 9/17/77 3,030 (897) 
1/22/77 7,980 (3,624) 9/24/77 2,202 (2,052) 
1/29/77 3,714 (7,291) 10/ 1/77 1,246 (4,111) 
2/ 5/77 1,433 (9,666) 10/ 8/77 462 (4, 64 7) 
2/12/77 (1,053) (12,140) 10/15/77 175 (3,753) 
2/19/77 (1,722) (11, 957) 10/22/77 (269) (6,836) 
2/26/77 (2,213) (10,050) 10/29/77 (837) (8,145) 
3/ 5/77 (2,924 (11,433) 11/ 5/77 (1,157) (9, 796) 
3/12/77 (2,479) (11, 381) 11/12/77 (1,226) (9,100) 
3/19/77 (1,550) (10,839) 11/19/77 (1,255) (9,215) 
3/26/77 (1,042) (9,246) 11/26/77 (1,202) (7,464) 
4/ 2/77 (1,028) (8, 321) 12/ 3/77 (1,851) (7,186) 
4/ 9/77 (817) (7,396) 12/10/77 (1,655) (6, 94 7) 
4/16/77 (301) (6,994) 12/17/77 (1,512) (7,068) 
4/23/77 (1,018) (5,921) 12/24/77 (1,353) (7 ,182) 
4/30/77 1,445 (4,378 12/31/77 (1,273) (6,865) 
1 
North Dakota Public Service Commission. Preliminary report on feasibility of state 
of North Dakota acquiring a covered hopper rail fleet. Bismarck, N. Dak. , Nov. 1978. 
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